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Executive summary 
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a major shock to the global and European economy. 
Most European countries will need to take bold quarantine and lock-down measures, as has 
been done in Italy, to prevent an explosion of the epidemic which would lead to many deaths 
and the collapse of healthcare systems.
The economic consequences of such measures are major, and are felt through both 
supply and demand-side channels. A coordinated and bold response by authorities is 
necessary. First, ample national funds need to be provided to national health services. 
Second, targeted measures to support individuals (such as the self-employed), companies 
and the local communities most affected should be put in place or reinforced. Third, broad 
macroeconomic insurance needs to be provided because targeted measures will not cover the 
many second-round effects of the shock.
To alleviate financial and cash-flow constraints, and to provide incentives to preserve 
employment, we recommend all European Union countries agree to halve companies’ social 
security contributions for three months, or cut the payroll tax. Such measures could amount 
to support of some 2.5 percent of GDP and would be funded by increased national deficits. 
Last but not least, the European Central Bank should provide abundant liquidity, increase 
swap lines to ensure sufficient dollar liquidity and increase its sovereign-bond purchase 
programme to prevent distress in sovereign bond markets. ‘Whatever it takes’ needs to be the 
motto to preserve lives and reduce the impact on the economy of the epidemic.
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1 Introduction
COVID-19 spread alarmingly rapidly in China after the country first alerted the World Health 
Organisation to several cases of unusual pneumonia at the end of December 20191. The 
Chinese authorities, after some initial vacillation, acted decisively to stop its spread, plac-
ing affected areas under effective quarantine. These measures have been apparently largely 
successful in containing the spread of the virus within Hubei province, the epicentre of the 
outbreak2.
Curbing the spread of the virus in such a short time has only been possible because China 
is able and willing to incur huge short-term economic losses and has used means (such as 
tracking of phones) that would not be easily acceptable in other parts of the world. In Febru-
ary, the Chinese economy came to a virtual halt. The composite PMI (Purchasing Managers’ 
Index) fell from 53.0 at the end of January to 27.5 at the end of February, the lowest level ever 
recorded in China3. No wonder that China’s GDP is expected to shrink in the first quarter of 
2020, the first contraction since the death of Chairman Mao. 
Given the role of China as the factory of the world and the importance of its market for 
products from other countries, this severe economic contraction is bound to affect compa-
nies throughout the world, including in Europe. But with the Chinese economy expected to 
rebound in Q2, it was initially hoped that the effect would be limited. Such hope has been 
dashed as the epidemic has become global. The European Union is heavily affected, with a 
particularly severe situation in Italy.
Even if EU countries manage, like China, to put in place quarantine and other drastic 
measures to stop the virus from spreading (as currently being done in Italy), the number of 
cases of infection is likely to increase significantly in the coming weeks. Infection curves in 
Italy, Germany, France and Spain and elsewhere in the EU so far look remarkably similar to 
that seen Hubei (see Figure 1 and the Annex). It would therefore not be surprising if the num-
bers of cases in Italy and France, which have similar populations to Hubei, reached similar 
levels to Hubei (officially about 68,000 at time of writing). In Germany, even higher numbers 
could be expected. This scenario cannot be ignored given the rapid spread of infection, and 
worse scenarios are entirely possible. 
This situation is already placing unprecedented pressure on health systems, most notably 
on intensive care units. As around 14 percent of COVID-19 cases require hospital care and 5 
percent intensive care, scaling-up intensive care units represents the top priority for govern-
ments, as currently exemplified by Italy (see Box 1).
As well as providing more resources for hospitals and healthcare systems in general, 
authorities need to limit the spread of the disease, including in some instances by closing 
down some activities, closing schools, encouraging people to stay home or even locking down 
entire cities, regions or even entire countries, like Italy. Inevitably, these measures have major 
effects on economic activity, to which economic policy needs to respond. The downgrades of 
economic forecasts by international institutions including the International Monetary Fund 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are characterised by 
huge uncertainty because of the unprecedented nature of the shock.
In Europe, national and regional authorities are mainly responsible for the health and 
economic policies to respond to the health and economic crises. But European countries are 
closely intertwined and therefore these responses need to be coordinated at European level. 
1 The virus was previously unknown. A week after the Chinese alert, it was announced that this virus was a new va-
riety belonging to the coronavirus family, which includes the common cold and SARS, the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome that killed more than 770 people worldwide in 2002-2003.
2 At time of writing, only 16 percent of the cases in mainland China are outside Hubei province, and barely 134 of the 
3,158 deaths in China have occurred outside Hubei.
3 See https://www.reuters.com/article/china-economy-pmi/chinas-services-activity-plunges-as-vi-
rus-wipes-sales-caixin-pmi-idUSZRN0008L4.
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In some instances, where European instruments exist, including the EU budget and the Euro-
pean Central Bank, they must also be deployed in support of national and regional policies.    
Our discussion is divided into two parts. First, we examine market reactions so far and the 
effects of measures already taken. Second, we make economic policy recommendations to 
both national and European authorities.
Figure 1: Confirmed COVID-19 cases, Italy, Spain, Germany and France compared to 
Hubei (cases per 10,000 inhabitants)
Source: Bruegel based on Johns Hopkins University, Eurostat. Notes: The dates in brackets represent day 1 for the specific country or 
region. Day 1 is calculated as the first day with 100 or more cases per 60 million (approximately the population of Hubei). 
2 Understanding market reactions and the 
effects of measures taken
Markets have reacted violently and a number of industries have taken a big hit from the 
COVID-19 shock. The S&P 500 has fallen by almost 18 percent from its peak in mid-February, 
while Eurostoxx 50 is down by almost 25 percent (data refers to 10 March). This is a more 
violent reaction than caused by previous epidemics. Measures of the volatility of financial 
markets, such as the VIX, have reached levels not seen since the 2008 crisis. Global demand 
for flights has seen an immediate and very sharp drop. The International Air Transport As-
sociation estimates4 global revenue losses for the passenger business of between $63 billion 
and $113 billion. Airline share prices have fallen nearly 25 percent since the outbreak began. 
This is 21 percentage points more than the decline that occurred at a similar point during 
the SARS crisis of 2003. Tourism in Italy has seen a 40 percent to 80 percent fall following the 
coronavirus outbreak5, and the situation will further worsen because of the country’s nation-
wide lockdown. France has also seen a 30 percent to 40 percent fall in tourists following the 
coronavirus outbreak6. 
4 See https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-03-05-01/.
5 See https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/turismo-coronavirus-crollano-prenotazioni-turistiche-pasqua-e-oltre-ACrS-
d5LB. 
6 See https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/23/coronavirus-impact-france-sees-tourism-numbers-fall-by-30percent-to-
40percent.html.
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Measures that limit social interaction have major economic effects well beyond the sec-
toral effects. Large parts of the economy, even in the digital era, depend on people-to-people 
interactions. Initially, the shock to the European economy resulted from supply-chain disrup-
tions due to the lock down in China. But as the virus has spread, further lock-down measures 
have been enacted in European countries, especially Italy. More measures will likely be taken 
in other EU countries in the coming weeks to limit and contain the spread of the virus. As 
lock-down measures are taken, production is affected in multiple ways. While initially mostly 
tourism and the transport sectors have been affected, the longer the measures last and the 
more comprehensive they become, the more the entire economy will be affected.
Box 1: The COVID-19 outbreak in Italy: facts and policy response
Italy has been the epicentre of the COVID-19 outbreak in the EU, accounting for 60 percent 
of confirmed cases and 90 percent of EU deaths (at time of writing). Italy is the second-most 
impacted country in the world after China. As the virus spread, most notably in Lombardy 
and neighbouring regions, the Italian government adopted increasingly tough measures to: i) 
contain the outbreak; ii) shore up the health system; iii) address the socio-economic impacts.
Containment measures
The government initially reacted to the spread of the virus by locking down the 11 most 
affected municipalities in Lombardy and Veneto – home to some 50,000 people – and by 
adopting other containment measures, including the temporary closure of schools and 
universities in all northern regions. As the number of cases has continued to multiply, the 
government has locked down the whole of Lombardy and other northern regions. On 9 
March, the government decided to extend internal travel restrictions to the entire country, 
effectively locking-down 60 million people.
Reinforcement of the health system
To shore up the health system in the face of the outbreak, the government has adopted 
measures to recruit more than 20,000 doctors, nurses and operators (such as recalling retired 
personnel and recruiting post-graduate medical students), to scale-up the purchase of inten-
sive-care ventilators and to enable the requisition of health materials and facilities in case 
of shortage. As 14 percent of COVID-19 cases require hospital care and 5 percent intensive 
care, scaling-up these capacities represents the top priority. Italy has about 5,000 intensive 
care beds, of which 900 are in Lombardy – too few to face this crisis. Regional authorities are 
thus trying to rapidly scale-up intensive care capacity, to avoid the collapse of the system.
Addressing the socio-economic impacts
On the socio-economic front, Italy has focused on providing social insurance to families and 
businesses. The government has adopted a series of measures to:
• Provide fresh funds to the Cassa integrazione guadagni, the national redundancy fund, 
which helps companies maintain the labour force in times of economic difficulties by pay-
ing part of workers’ wages;
• Provide financial aid of €500/month for three months to self-employed workers;
• Provide fresh funds to Fondo di Garanzia per le PMI, a national guarantee scheme aimed 
at giving SMEs access to finance;
• Suspend mortgage payments, tax payments and social security contributions;
• Provide tax credits for businesses that have reported a 25 percent drop in revenues;
• Provide parental leave and vouchers for babysitters to cope with school closure; 
• Italy initially allocated €900 million to implement such measures in the 11 municipalities 
quarantined in February. Italy has allocated an additional €25 billion (1.1 percent of GDP) 
to implement the measures country-wide.
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This economic shock is a combination of both supply and demand effects. The initial 
supply shock came from supply-chain disruption7 and was followed by the effects of people 
being kept away from their jobs. The initial demand shock came from uncertainty about the 
heath and economic situation, which led consumers to cut their physical interactions with 
others and companies to delay investment. The resulting falls in incomes and revenues led to 
a further fall in demand, which in turn has led to cuts in supply as companies have difficulties 
paying their employees and meet their financial obligations. Second round effects are likely to 
become stronger the longer the lock-down measures persist: demand will fall as consumers 
postpone or even cancel their consumption. While for some consumption there might be 
catching-up consumption later when the health crisis is over, other consumption is unlikely 
to recover – for example restaurant visits. Finally, demand is affected by confidence effects. As 
citizens worry about the future, they might increase their precautionary savings.
The longer the health problem lasts the longer the economic difficulties will last. 
Clearly, Europe and other parts of the world are not China. EU countries might not be able or 
willing to take the kind of strict measures adopted by China to stem the spread of the virus in 
the space of about one month. The result could be that many more people will be infected and 
that partial lock-down measures will last for longer. We are likely already beyond the point 
where the virus can be contained in specific regions and so the real question is how much one 
can slow the spread of the virus using economically costly lock-down measures, in order to 
prevent health systems from collapsing.
Open borders require a coordinated approach to the pandemic. As long as borders 
are open and travel relatively unrestricted between EU countries, EU countries should adopt 
a common view on the choice between the strictness of the lock-down measures and the 
immediate economic fallout, while keeping in mind the specific conditions that prevail in 
each country. Failing to coordinate their response is sure to make the health and economic 
crises in EU countries worse than they would be otherwise.
If the pandemic becomes severe in other parts of the world, coordination will be 
required at global level. As the virus spreads widely in Europe and in the US, it is also 
important to contemplate the consequences for China and other global economies. The more 
widely it spreads in the US and Europe, the more China, Japan and other global economies 
will have to restrict travel into their countries if they want to prevent a renewed spread of 
the virus. As a result, international travel could become constrained for a substantial period. 
Moreover, as the major global trading hubs of Europe and the US see their GDP and output 
plummet, global trade and supply chains with China and other economies will also be 
affected. So, there will likely be second-round effects of measures in Europe and the US, 
which will weigh on the global economy.
3 How can public authorities in Europe 
respond?
The scale of the health crisis is very substantial. Public authorities need to give health 
services the adequate resources. According to the WHO, about 80 percent patients with 
COVID-19 experience mild illness, while approximately 14 percent experience severe 
symptoms, thus requiring hospitalisation. Overall, 5 percent are critically ill, thus requiring 
7 For a detailed discussion, see Maria Demertzis and Gerard Masllorens, ‘The cost of coronavirus in terms of inter-
rupted global value chains’, Bruegel Blog, 9 March 2020, available at https://www.bruegel.org/2020/03/the-cost-of-
coronavirus-in-terms-of-interrupted-global-value-chains/.
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intensive care8. As the virus spreads, the strain on health services is high in several countries 
and is likely to continue to increase. Lombardy is a clear example of this as it has high-
quality health services9, but is struggling because of a shortage of intensive-care beds. Public 
authorities need to provide sufficient financial resources so emergency activities can be 
quickly expanded. They also need to increase their efforts to procure the necessary medical 
equipment and supplies of which there are shortages.
European solidarity could alleviate bottlenecks in health provisioning through tempo-
rary secondments of doctors and sharing of medical supplies. As different EU regions and 
countries are at different stages of the spread of the virus, they face different levels of hospi-
talisation and stress on medical supplies and workers. Temporary secondment schemes for 
doctors, sharing of medical supplies and cooperation in procuring medical equipment and 
supplies would help manage shortages. This is the opposite of what certain EU countries have 
been doing by imposing export bans on masks and other personal protective equipment10. 
Clearly if each country imposes export bans on certain critical supplies all countries will 
suffer, as none can be self-sufficient. 
At national level, we see three main areas where fiscal authorities can provide tar-
geted support. First, in many EU countries, health insurance already does cover the costs 
of quarantine measures. If necessary, health insurance can be supported by public budgets. 
Second, a support fund could be established to assist those sectors that are most affected. 
The German Kurzarbeitergeld and the Italian Cassa integrazione guadagni are good possi-
ble examples of ways to support companies and workers that have to reduce their output. 
Third, we consider the provision of monthly lump-sum transfers to the self-employed that are 
immediately vulnerable to a collapse in demand as key to safeguard this vulnerable group of 
workers until the end of the emergency period. As schools have to close for long periods (as in 
Italy), governments must put in place extraordinary schemes to support child care (for exam-
ple, from vouchers for baby sitters, as is being done in Italy, to extraordinary parental leave). 
There is evidence that school closures magnify substantially the economic effects (Keogh-
Brown et al, 2010), an additional reason to establish fiscal buffers. Finally, fiscal support for 
local and regional communities needs to be given because they often bear a significant part of 
the burden. Bank information can identify financial distress among companies and individu-
als (eg on loan and mortgage payments, on tax servicing or any other arrears).
The EU’s fiscal rules do not constrain a targeted fiscal response to a health emergency. 
First, any one-off budgetary spending incurred in relation to the response to the outbreak 
is excluded from the computation of the structural balance11. Second, the current fiscal frame-
work already provides adequate margins of flexibility to cater for “unusual events outside the 
control of government”, provided that “the temporary deviation does not endanger fiscal sus-
tainability in the medium-term”12. There is thus no need to debate a change of the fiscal rules 
in the context of the coronavirus.
The EU could provide insurance to countries or regions most affected through its 
budget. The EU Treaty contains a solidarity clause that invites the EU and its members to 
act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster13. On this basis, the EU could provide financial aid 
to countries or regions most affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. On 10 March, the European 
8 See https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200301-sitrep-41-covid-19.pdf?s-
fvrsn=6768306d_2. 
9 Health services in Lombardy score 9.9/10 according to the OECD and are in the top 5 percent of all OECD regions 
(https://oecdregionalwellbeing.org/ITC4.html).
10 See https://www.politico.eu/article/health-ministers-squabble-over-face-masks-at-coronavirus-talks/. 
11 This was clearly spelled-out in a letter that Commissioners Dombrovskis and Gentiloni sent on 5 March to Italy’s 
Finance Minister Gualtieri, concerning the country’s fiscal decisions related to the COVID-19 outbreak. See http://
www.mef.gov.it/inevidenza/La-risposta-della-Ue-spese-contro-il-Covid-19-escluse-dal-deficit-strutturale/.  
12 See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20399/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. 
13 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 222.
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Commission proposed a €25 billion Corona Response Investment Initiative, directed at 
supporting health care systems, SMEs and labour markets across Europe. According to the 
proposal, €7.5 billion of investment liquidity would be released14 by the Commission to 
trigger the release and use of some €17.5-18 billion of Structural Funding across the EU. This 
is a start but additional funds should be mobilised in the framework of the EU budget. A 
first tool might be the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF), which functions as a sort of supranational 
insurance policy against natural disasters including floods, forest fires, earthquakes, storms 
and droughts. The EUSF Regulation ((EU) No 661/2014) should be rapidly amended in order 
to: i) equate epidemics/pandemics to natural disasters; ii) increase the financial firepower 
of the fund; iii) streamline its long activation process15 by giving authority to the European 
Commission. To give an example of the potential order of magnitude, Italy received €1.2 
billion following the earthquakes that occurred in central Italy between August 2016 and 
January 2017. A second tool might be the Flexibility instrument, which provides funding for 
clearly identified expenditure that cannot be covered by the EU budget without exceeding a 
maximum threshold. A third tool is the Contingency margin, which represents a last resort 
instrument to react to unforeseen circumstances and which amounts to 0.03 percent of the 
EU’s gross national income. Both the Flexibility instrument and the Contingency margin 
have been used in the past to finance immediate budgetary measures to address ongoing 
migration, refugee and security crises, so it could now be used to counter COVID-19.
The shock is leading to distress in the financial system and in sovereign bond markets, 
which needs to be alleviated by bold central bank action. Uncertainty has led to major 
volatility in financial assets and broad-based stress in the financial system. Some companies 
and households will be late in meeting their financial obligations, for example mortgage 
payments. Central banks need to provide abundant liquidity to support the financial system 
and prevent short-term liquidity needs from jeopardising productive economic activity. 
Stress in interbank markets and money markets needs to be addressed. Swap lines need to 
be robust and substantial so that the European central banks can provide dollar liquidity if 
needed. Finally, this exogenous shock may well lead to major distress in euro-area sovereign 
bond markets. Rather than risking major increases in spreads, we recommend that the bond 
purchase programmes of the ECB and other European central banks should be increased16. 
Increasing sovereign bond purchases would help support distressed sovereign bond markets. 
We see little scope for monetary policy stimulus but a very significant role in ensuring liquid-
ity provision and helping support productive companies that might be in distress. Deter-
mined action by monetary authorities is urgent. The ECB in particular should act.
Three arguments suggest that beyond targeted measures, national fiscal policy 
makers should provide macroeconomic ‘insurance’. First, targeted measures are unlikely to 
identify and therefore address all those affected, given the need for speedy reaction. Second, 
many companies and individuals will be affected through second-round effects, as discussed 
in section 2. For example, airlines losing customers will also require fewer supplies, affecting 
companies further down the supply chain. And in a globally highly interconnected economy, 
shocks propagate across continents and can reinforce each other. Third and perhaps most 
14 The European Commission proposes to relinquish this year its obligation to request refunding of unspent pre-
financing for European structural and investment funds currently held by EU countries.
15 Antoine Mathieu Collin and Simone Tagliapetra, ‘Italy’s floods: How the European Union Solidarity Fund can help’, 
Bruegel Blog, 23 November 2018, available at https://www.bruegel.org/2018/11/italys-floods-how-the-europe-
an-union-solidarity-fund-can-help/. 
16 The main problem for the ECB in increasing its asset purchases in the current crisis is that its QE programme 
is constrained by its (self-imposed) issuer limit. The ECB is already quite close to the limit in several countries, 
in particular the Netherlands and Germany. In the current setup, this implies that purchases could have to be 
stopped in a few months (or to deviate from capital keys), especially if the volume of purchases is increased signif-
icantly. The most obvious answer to this, and a good signal for markets at the moment, would be to increase the 
issuer limit once again, at the very least for well-rated countries, so this policy can be used as much as needed in 
the current situation.
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importantly, an epidemic might also affect expectations and create a crisis of confidence. 
Macroeconomic policy authorities have a major role to play in managing expectations and 
supporting the economy. While an announcement of fiscal measures might not bring guests 
back to restaurants, it will support citizens’ confidence in general that governments do indeed 
make the funds available first to manage the pandemic, and second to support the economy 
during and after the shock.
A timely and coordinated fiscal response is indispensable. The EU will do well to 
discuss and agree on a coordinated response in order to be able to mobilise funds in a timely 
way. An announcement of coordinated fiscal measures would have a number of advantages. 
First, if only some countries react, especially those with relatively high debt levels, sovereign 
spreads could increase. Second, fiscal measures have cross-border effects. Coordination 
therefore increases the effectiveness of the measures, irrespective of the precise magnitude of 
spill-overs. Third, the impact of the virus and the associated economic implications are likely 
to be felt in all of Europe. A joint response to such a symmetric shock therefore makes sense. 
Finally, while this crisis is different to the 2009 crisis, because of its simultaneous supply and 
demand side shock, a joint signal of demand support would still be effective to boost confi-
dence and support the economy also in its recovery phase, when the epidemic recedes. 
Overall and on balance, we therefore recommend that national authorities provide a 
generalised safety net to the economy. Going beyond targeted support for specific com-
panies that are particularly heavily affected, a general support scheme could be designed. 
For example, given the severity of the situation, finance ministers could agree a coordinated 
measure whereby, during a period of, say, three months, all social security contributions by 
companies would be halved. Such support would greatly reduce cash-flow constraints, pro-
vide income support especially for companies with many employees, and be of a macroeco-
nomically relevant size. It would also provide an incentive to preserve employment. If annual 
social security contributions amount to some 20 percent of GDP, such a scheme would 
provide a boost of 2.5 percent to the economy. In the current situation, such an increase in the 
deficit could be funded at essentially zero cost. The increase in the deficit would also help sta-
bilise financial markets. In fact, safe assets are in short supply as investors scramble to move 
into sovereign bonds. The advantage of such a measure would be also that it could be enacted 
quickly, unlike new spending programmes.
4 Conclusions
It is impossible to know how long the health crisis will last and how many people will be 
affected. But already now, at a relatively early stage of the epidemic in Europe, the economic 
impact has been very significant. The longer that measures have to be taken to contain the 
virus, and the stricter those measures, the greater their impact on the global economy. 
We have argued that fiscal policymakers need first and foremost address the health 
emergency with sufficient resources. After that, fiscal resources will need to provide direct 
support to the individuals and sectors most affected. The aim is to protect otherwise produc-
tive capacity so it continues to exist after the shock. But beyond direct measures, national 
policymakers should coordinate a general safety net. There are many ways of doing this, 
such as in the form of temporary cuts to social security contributions (say by half for a period 
of three months) and by temporarily funding mortgage payments. 
Beyond the immediate crisis response, policymakers will also have to think about 
sustained measures after the epidemic subsides. What kind of measures will be needed to 
reboot the economy? This is a not only a question for the EU but also for the global econ-
omy, as different parts of the world might be in different phases of fighting the virus. Fears of 
‘reverse’ virus contagion might, for example, limit travel to China and other places.
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The pandemic could trigger a rethink of global economic exposures and production 
patterns. Will companies decide to increase stocks to be better equipped in the future to deal 
with supply chain disruptions? Will they reduce the length of value chains to become less 
vulnerable to such shocks? And how will international travel be transformed? As always, such 
a crisis is also an opportunity to revisit business models and, perhaps also in consideration of 
the threat to the climate, to reassess international mobility.
There is a clear role for the EU to play in terms of showing to people the power of 
cooperation. So far, responses in different EU countries appear barely coordinated and there 
has been very little EU communication. It is important that EU institutions provide short-
term support17 and coordinate the response across countries. The EU should also increase 
its support for the development of medication and vaccines, true public goods, where the 
incentives for private pharmaceuticals companies might be insufficient. 
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Annex
Figure 2: Confirmed COVID-19 cases in Hubei, China (cases per 10,000 
inhabitants)
Source: Bruegel based on Johns Hopkins University, Eurostat. Notes: The date in brackets represents day 1 for the specific country or 
region. Day 1 is calculated as the first day with 100 or more cases per 60 million (approximately the population of Hubei). 
17 The European Commission has announced a €25 billion ‘Corona Response Investment Initiative’ for the health 
care sector and to support SMEs. It remains to be seen to what extent this is actually additional support. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_440.
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Figure 3: Confirmed COVID-19 cases in EU countries, the UK, Japan and Korea compared to Hubei (cases per 
10,000 inhabitants; x-axis in each case is number of days since start of outbreak)
Source: Bruegel based on Johns Hopkins University, Eurostat. Notes: The date in brackets represents day 1 for the specific country or region. Day 1 is calculated as the first day with 100 
or more cases per 60 million (approximately the population of Hubei). Only EU countries that have reached this threshold are included.
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